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COMMENT ON PROF. IMWINKELRIED’S “FORMALISM v. PRAGMATISM IN EVIDENCE: 
RECONSIDERING THE ABSOLUTE BAN ON THE USE OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE TO 
PROVE IMPEACHING UNTRUTHFUL ACTS THAT HAVE NOT RESULTED IN 
CONVICTION” 
JUST WHAT EVIDENCE OF WITNESS MISDEEDS DOES FEDERAL EVIDENCE RULE 
608(b) EXCLUDE?---IMWINKELRIED vs. ROTHSTEIN 
By Paul F. Rothstein1 
 
Prof. Edward Imwinkelried, one of the country’s most renowned Evidence scholars, in a 
recent article in this journal,2 perceptively identifies three specific examples of evidence of a 
witness’s prior unconvicted-for misconduct which he correctly believes should be admissible to 
impeach the witness’s credibility in the discretion of the trial judge:  
1.  Evidence of demonstrably false previous accusations of rape against the present 
defendant by the complaining witness in a rape prosecution (assuming the rape shield 
would not exclude3) which the witness will not admit to during cross examination; 
2.  Documentary evidence proving an unrelated misdeed of a testifying witness clearly 
evincing the witness’s lack of credibility, where the witness himself on cross exam could 
                                                          
1Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, specializing in Evidence. He is the author of numerous books 
and articles on Evidence and related matters including among others EVIDENCE: CASES, MATERIALS AND 
PROBLEMS (4th Ed. 2013 plus electronic supplement 2015) (with Myrna Raeder & David Crump) and a series of 
articles and postings on recent developments under the Confrontation Clause which have made SSRN’s “Top Ten” 
lists, including  Unwrapping the Box the Supreme Court Justices Have Gotten Themselves Into: Internal 
Confrontations Over Confronting the Confrontation forthcoming Fall 2015, How. L. Rev.,  currently posted on SSRN; 
Ambiguous-Purpose Statements of Children and Other Victims of Abuse Under the Confrontation Clause, 
forthcoming Fall 2015, S.W. L. Rev., currently posted on SSRN; Two Excursions into Current U.S. Supreme Court 
Opinion-Writing, https://casetext.com/posts/two-excursions-into-current-us-supreme-
court-opinion-writing; and Comment on the Supreme Court’s Decision in Ohio v. 
Clark: The Confrontation Clause Evolves, https://casetext.com/posts/a-
comment-on-the-supreme-courts-decision-in-ohio-v-clark. Rothstein has been a Fulbright 
Scholar at Oxford University England, a trial lawyer in Washington, D.C., and an advisor on the Federal Rules of 
Evidence (hereinafter “F.R.E.”) to the U.S. Congress, the U.S. Department of Justice, and several Washington law 
firms and government  agencies,  and on Evidence and related matters to several nations and U.S. states.  
 
2 Edward J.  Imwinkelried, Formalism Versus Pragmatsm in Evidence: Reconsidering the Absolute Ban on the Use of 
Extrinsic Evidence to Prove Impeaching, Untruthful Acts That Have Not Resulted in a Conviction,48 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 213 (2015). 
 
3 A rape shield—for example F.R.E. 412—excludes from evidence the sexual history of complainant. But frequently 
rape shields are held not to cover evidence of previous false rape accusations either because the evidence is not 
deemed evidence of “sexual behavior” or “sexual predisposition” of the type banned by the shield, or because, as 
in Prof. Imwinkelried’s specific example, the previous accusations were against the defendant himself. Conduct 
that is previous conduct involving the defendant himself, is usually exempted from the shield, as it is in, e.g., F.R.E. 
412(b) (1) (B). See Paul F. Rothstein, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 244, 248 (3d Ed. 2014-15). 
2 
 
authenticate the document so it could be used conveniently and expeditiously without 
undue time consumption; and 
3.  Evidence of the result in an unrelated previous civil action, for example where the 
witness was a party and an adverse verdict clearly establishes his position was fabricated, 
or where he was only a witness but the verdict makes it clear the trier of fact rejected his 
contention as fabricated. 
I agree with Prof Imwinkelried that these can be powerful pieces of evidence on occasion and 
should be admissible in the judge’s discretion upon consideration of such factors as probative 
value on the issue of the witness’s credibility, time consumption, and prejudice.  But Prof. 
Imwinkelried and I disagree as to whether the literal language of Federal Rule of Evidence 
608(b) bans them absolutely.  Prof. Imwinkelried believes it does, and therefore should be 
amended. I believe it does not and therefore does not require amendment. 
THE ARGUMENT 
Rule 608 (b) bans evidence of a witness’s unconvicted-for misdeeds if proving them 
involves using “extrinsic” evidence, no matter how powerfully probative of lying they are, how 
little time they would consume to present, and how little prejudice they might entail. “Extrinsic” 
(as opposed to “intrinsic”) evidence is evidence adduced through means other than cross 
examination of the witness being impeached. For example, a misdeed is proved “extrinsically” if 
the way it is evidenced is by independently introducing other witnesses, documents, or 
recordings that attest to the witness’s commission of the misdeed or provide details about it.4 
Imwinkelried implies his three numbered instances (above) are merely examples and that 
there are many other instances, too, where evidence of witness misdeeds demonstrating the 
witness’s non-veracity should be discretionarily admissible even if extrinsically proved, but 
which the Rule’s blanket extrinsic evidence ban allows only on cross examination. His whole 
argument, however, hinges on the three examples. He cites cases in which he says courts have 
recognized the value of the kind of evidence in his examples and have found it necessary to 
violate the rule to let it in, and other cases where he says the courts have refused to do so even 
though it would be desirable to let the evidence in.5 
It is my contention that it is only a misconstruction of Rule 608(b) that would preclude 
discretion to admit his three examples of evidence. Under a proper construction, the evidence is 
not excluded and the Rule therefore does not need revision. The courts that want to admit the 
evidence do not need to disregard the rule. The evidence can be admitted perfectly consistently 
with the rule. Further, Prof. Imwinkelried has not convincingly shown that there is other 
deserving evidence outside of his three examples that is banned by the Rule.  
 
                                                          
4 See, defining extrinsic evidence, Paul F. Rothstein, Myrna S. Raeder, & David Crump, EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL 
173 (6th Ed. 2012); Rothstein, note 3 supra, at 441 et seq.  
5 See Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 218-19, 228-32.. 
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The Three Examples Are Not Really Rendered Inadmissible by the Rule 
 
Prof. Imwinkelried’s argument regarding the three examples relies on two 
misconceptions, though each has some support in previous (but misguided in my opinion) 
authority. The first misconception is that Rule 608 applies to all unconvicted-for misdeeds of a 
witness offered to impeach the witness’s credibility whatever the theory of impeachment. In fact, 
the Rule only applies where the theory is showing a bad character regarding credibility.  This 
first mistake is manifest in his example #1 above, prior false allegations of rape against the 
present rape defendant.  
The second misconception is this. He is under the misconception that even if proving the 
misdeed can be completely accomplished through cross examination, the evidence is still 
“extrinsic” and banned by the terms of 608(b) if it has anything to do with a document or a 
previous judicial event. This applies to his #2, documents acknowledged by the witness during 
cross examination, attesting to the prior unrelated misdeed involving lying, and his #3, a 
previous unrelated civil case event indicating lying, adduced through the present cross 
examination.6  
 
The Terms of Rule 608(b) 
 
In pertinent part, Rule 608(b) provides: 
Except for a criminal conviction under Rule 609, extrinsic evidence is not 
admissible to prove specific instances of a witness’s conduct in order to 
attack…the witness’s character for truthfulness….But the court may, on cross 
examination, allow them to be inquired into if they are probative of the character 
for…untruthfulness of…the witness….” 
A few terms in the rule that are instrumental to our inquiry need further explaining: 
“Extrinsic” evidence is generally defined as evidence other than that adduced during cross 
examination of the witness being impeached. In other words, although the evidence is addressed 
to impeaching the credibility of this witness, it is introduced through another witness, or through 
                                                          
6 My terminology labels these as “misconceptions” but the reader should be aware that both Prof. Imwinkelried’s 
view on each of them (including the view of authorities on which he relies) and my view are both reasonable 
alternative views of the legal concepts involved. It is not that I think his view is unreasonable or insupportable; just 
that, of course, I believe mine are preferable.  This is a debate between reasonable scholars, both of whose 
interpretations are legitimate and respectable.  It is a difference of opinion, in the highest traditions of legal 
scholarship. The differing views are presented for the reader to select between. This entire paper should be read in 
that light. 
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a document, a recording, or some other item introduced independently.7  “Character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness” means a proclivity of the witness to be truthful or untruthful that 
may surface in a variety of matters.8 
Let us examine more closely the three evidence examples identified by Prof. 
Imwinkelried that he alleges are absolutely excluded by a literal reading of Rule 606(b), to see if 
they really are so excluded. 
 
Prof. Imwinkelried’s Example #1: Extrinsic Evidence of Prior Clearly False Accusations of Rape 
by the Same Complaining Witness Against the Current Rape Defendant9 
 
In this example the offered evidence consists of some kind of extrinsic evidence like 
testimony of another person or a record establishing the prior accusations and their falsity. In 
other words, the evidence is not just an inquiry and response on cross examination of the 
complaining witness (which would be called “intrinsic” evidence and which clearly would be 
allowed insofar as Rule 608(b) is concerned). The thing that allegedly makes the evidence 
inadmissible under 608(b) is its “extrinsic” mature—its “non-cross-exam” nature. If the evidence 
is confined just to cross examination, there is no conceivable problem posed by 608(b).  
But, under a proper construction of Rule 608(b), this evidence, whether in the extrinsic or 
intrinsic form, would not be subject to 608(b) at all! The prior incidents here (the prior false 
allegations of rape) are not offered as showing the witness has a general “character” for 
incredibility (the only kind of impeachment covered by 608(b)), but rather are offered to show 
specifically that the complaining witness lies about rape by this accused—i.e. has a motive to 
“get” this defendant.10 By its express terms, Rule 608(b) applies only when a “character” for 
                                                          
7 See  U.S. v. Thomas, 467 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2006), cert. denied 549 U.S. 1294 (2007); U.S. v. Martz, 964 F.2d 787 (8th 
Cir. 1992); U.S. v. Brooke, 4 F.3d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 
8 See U.S. v. James, 609 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1979); Rothstein, supra note 3 at 440, 445, 446; Advisory Committee Note 
to Rule 608, 56 F.R.D. 183, 268 (1973). 
9 This example is  set forth at Imwinkelried, note 2 supra, at 230 et seq. 
10 My analysis would be the same even if the false allegations made by the victim and offered by the defendant 
here were allegations against others than the defendant. 
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incredibility is being shown.11  Here the effort is more properly described as impeachment by 
showing a particular motive or bias. 12 
“Character” is a very general propensity consisting of a broad trait like “dishonesty”, 
“untrustworthiness”, “unreliability”, “violence” etc. While we might say a complaining witness 
has an “untrustworthy character,” we would be doing violence to language to say “the 
complaining witness has a character to falsely accuse Daniel Defendant of rape” although we 
might say “she has a propensity to do so.”   A specific propensity is different from a character-
type propensity, which is a general propensity manifesting itself in a wide variety of 
circumstances.13 The impeachment of the witness here is not proceeding on a theory of a general 
character for untrustworthiness, which is all that is covered by Rule 608(b). It is rather 
proceeding along the lines of a specific propensity to accuse this specific defendant specifically 
of rape. The main advisory committee note for Rule 608(b)14 as well as many cases,15 make clear 
that 608(b)’s strictures—including the ban on extrinsic evidence--do not apply if the purpose of 
the offer of an incident of the witness’s wrongdoing is not to show a general character for 
incredibility, but rather some other form of impeachment more specifically focused on the facts 
of the present case.16 There is a good reason for treating the more specifically focused 
impeachment more receptively than impeachment by character showings. The former is much 
more probative and less susceptible to prejudice and exaggeration. 
It may even be that this prior-false-allegation evidence should not be deemed 
impeachment evidence at all, but rather substantive evidence, going directly to whether the rape 
                                                          
11 Under F.R.E. 404(b), which is the master rule on character, it is expressly recognized—as under the law of every 
state ib the ubion-- that other wrongs used to show “motive”, “plan”, or a very specific pattern or “modus 
operandi” to do very specific things or things in a certain way, do not constitute a character showing. See Paul F. 
Rothstein, Comment, The Doctrine of Chances, Brides of the Bath, and a Reply to Sean Sullivan, 14 J. LAW, 
PROBABILITY AND RISK 51, at 51-52 (2015).  This non-character showing is what we have here. 
 
12 Lest I be misunderstood to be saying this is the only way to look at what character is, what form of impeachment 
is involved here, and how Rule 608(b) should be interpreted on these matters, see note 6, supra.  
 
13 See Paul F. Rothstein, Intellectual Coherence in an Evidence Code, 28 LOY. (L.A.) L. REV. 1259 at ____ (1995); 
Rothstein, supra note 11 at 60-61. 
14 See first few lines of Advisory Committee Note to Rule 608, supra, note 8;  
15 See e.g. U.S. v. James, 609 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1979) (impeaching by misdeed to show improper bias or motive 
rather than general character for incredibioity, is not within 608(b)); U.S. v. Ray, 731 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(semble); U.S. v. Garcia, 900 F. 2d 571 (2d Cir. 1990) (semble as to impeachment by contradiction); U.S. v. Perez-
Perez, 72 F.3d 224 (1st Cir. 1995) (semble); cf. U.S. v. White, 405 F.3d 208 (4th Cir. 2005) (semble as to substantive 
use). 
16  A classic example where 608(b) does not apply to an incident of wrongdoing by the witness when the 
wrongdoing is offered on another theory than impeachment of general credibility character, would be where the 
defense attempts to show that a prosecution witness has committed another unrelated crime and has not been 
prosecuted for it, suggesting that the witness is beholden to the prosecution and that is why the witness is 
testifying in this case for the prosecution. This is impeachment by bias or motive, not covered by Rule 608(b), even 
though the offer is of a specific instance of wrongdoing committed by the witness. See James and Ray, note 15 
supra. 
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occurred. In that event, it would not be subject to the ban on extrinsic evidence of Rule 608(b) at 
all, since that rule deals only with evidence offered on the issue of witness credibility.17 
 
Prof. Imwinkelried’s Example #2: A Document Showing an Unrelated Falsity (Not Convicted 
For) Perpetrated by the Witness18  
 
Presumably what we are talking about here, under Prof. Imwinkelried’s second example, 
is a document that establishes that a present witness told an untruth on another particular 
occasion—an untruth relating to another matter than one involved in the particular litigation. 
Thus, unlike example #1 above (prior false rape allegations), the effort of the offering attorney 
here would be the kind of impeachment--impeachment of character for credibility--that is 
covered by Rule 608(b). The untruthful incident here has not resulted in a conviction, because 
that would be covered by Rule 609 instead. So what we have here might be, for example, a 
document from the IRS showing a witness in a murder trial lied on his tax return (assuming we 
can get around the hearsay rule by invocation of the “not for truth” concept or the public records 
hearsay exception19). 
The question here, then, is whether this is indeed “extrinsic” evidence, which, when 
impeachment of character-for-credibility is attempted, is barred by the express terms of 608(b). 
Prof. Imwinkelried is of the belief that it is extrinsic evidence and therefore is so barred.20 But a 
closer look reveals that it may not be extrinsic evidence. That depends upon some additional 
facts, which we take up in the following paragraphs. 
In Prof. Imwinkelried’s example of this kind of evidence, he postulates that the document 
will be authenticated by the witness himself. This is why Prof. Imwinkelried thinks the document 
should be discretionarily admissible, even though he believes the strict terms of 608(b) make it 
automatically inadmissible. He argues it should be admissible (if other Rules like 403 are 
satisfied) because it will be authenticated by the witness himself. Thus it will not entail the undue 
time consumption that 608(b)’s ban on extrinsic evidence was intended to prevent. It could, 
however, be argued that for this very reason, it is not “extrinsic” evidence at all. Extrinsic 
evidence is evidence that would take time beyond the cross examination to introduce.21  
                                                          
17 See White, note 15, supra. This might also be called impeachment by contradiction, also not covered by the rule. 
See Garcia, note 15 supra.. 
18 This example is set forth at Imwinkelried, note 2 supra, at 232. 
19 See Paul F. Rothstein, Myrna S. Raeder, & David Crump, EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL 393-94 (6th Ed. 2012) 
(describing the “truth of the matter asserted” concept); F.R.E. 803(8) (public records hearsay exception). 
20 Imwinkelried, supra note 2 at 218, 232. 
21 If the witness refuses to authenticate, then of course it would clearly be extrinsic evidence if the 
lawyer offering the document wishes to go further and get the evidence in, because that would require 
another witness, presumably. 
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Nevertheless, introducing a document does seem like it comes within a common-sense 
definition of extrinsic evidence, whether the document is introduced during cross examination, or 
during the cross examiner’s next chance to put on his own evidence (say his rebuttal case). Let us 
accept this proposition, i.e., that the document is extrinsic evidence whenever it is offered. Then 
the answer to the question whether we have extrinsic evidence in Prof. Imwinkelried’s example 
depends upon whether in the example, the document is itself being offered into evidence, or 
whether when the witness we are impeaching himself authenticates the document (as stipulated 
in the example), the witness also admits the truth of what is recited in it—in other words, admits 
not only that the document issued from the IRS to him (which is all authentication actually 
involves), but also admits that the document is correct that the witness lied to the IRS. If he 
admits the latter, then the document is not itself being introduced; rather, the witness has adopted 
its contents into his testimony. In other words, he has testified on cross examination that he lied 
to the IRS. This is clearly not extrinsic evidence. It is intrinsic evidence. It is a part of the cross 
examination. 
The 2003 Advisory Committee Note attending an amendment to Rule 608 seems to 
support Imwinkelried’s position that this is extrinsic evidence, regardless of the distinction I have 
made regarding the witness’s adoption of the content.22 That Committee Note--which in other 
respects is absolutely superb--refers for support to an ambiguous comment by justly esteemed 
evidence expert Prof. Stephen Saltzburg which says that certain forbidden extrinsic evidence 
cannot be “tucked into” a cross examination in order to escape the ban on extrinsic evidence. 23 I 
believe that view (if it is indeed the view of these two authorities) is mistaken both conceptually 
and practically, and does violence to the plain meaning and legal meaning of the word 
“extrinsic” in the rule.24  
To the extent the 2003 Advisory Committee Note suggests that adoption of the content of 
the document by the witness during cross exam, is banned extrinsic evidence, the Note is out-of-
keeping with the intent of the original Advisory Committee Note written by the original drafters 
of Rule 608(b) which seemed to say that anything that was wholly done on cross examination of 
the witness-being-impeached would not be considered extrinsic.25 
                                                          
22 Advisory Committee Note to 2003 Amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 608, reproduced in Appendix I in 
Rothstein, note 3, supra, at 1043.  
 
23 Stephen A. Saltzburg, Impeaching the Witness: Prior Bad Acts and Extrinsic Evidence,7 CRIM. JUST. 28, 31 (Winter 
1993). At least one court has directly addressed the “tucking in” comment and rejected it. U.S. v. Dawson, 434 F.3d 
956  (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1101 (2006). 
 
24 Again, lest I be misunderstood to be saying that such view is unreasonable, see my footnote 6, supra. I am just 
saying we have a legitimate, respectable scholarly difference of opinion, both opinions deserving consideration by 
the reader. 
 
25 See Advisory Committee Note supra note 8, at subdivision (b). 
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If the witness does not admit that the document correctly reports that he committed the 
misdeed, and the document itself is offered (whether during the cross examination or later, 
independently) then the document clearly is extrinsic evidence as banned by 608(b), and properly 
should be excluded, in my view, for the reasons expressed in the next paragraph below and in the 
section of this article labeled “conclusion.”  
Professor Imwinkelried may believe that where the witness does not make this admission, 
there should be judicial discretion to allow the extrinsic evidence. Imwinkelried would argue 
that, depending on the exact facts, the evidence may be important and the witness should not be 
encouraged to commit perjury by making a false denial of the misdeed knowing extrinsic 
evidence cannot contradict him. But I think the time and distraction into collateral matters 
overrides any slim probative worth the extrinsic evidence is likely to have.  Some jurisdictions 
don’t allow intrinsic or extrinsic impeachment by misdeeds not resulting in convictions, 
believing that the balance comes out against admission even when the inquiry is narrowly 
confined to cross examination. 26 
Prof. Imwinkelreid does have a point that some witnesses may be encouraged to commit 
perjury and deny the prior misdeed if the inquiry is allowed on cross examination and the 
witness’s perjurious denial in response cannot be followed up by extrinsic proof of the 
misdeed.27 Imwinkelried argues that other incentives against perjury here are weak: that perjury 
prosecutions in this situation are rare as a matter of prosecutorial discretion, and that there is a 
privilege against civil liability in many jurisdictions in connection with being a witness in a 
case.28 Nevertheless, I think the inducement to perjury here constitutes a rather small risk. 
Witnesses by and large are still afraid of committing perjury and don’t think they are safe from 
perjury-based civil or criminal proceedings. Anyway, Prof. Imwinkelried’s solution still gives 
the judge discretion to exclude extrinsic follow-up, 29 and the judge usually would do so. Thus 
there would still be some temptation to perjury. At any rate, if perjury in this situation is a 
substantial problem, that is an issue best addressed by reforming perjury law, tort law (the 
litigation privilege) and prosecutorial practices.   
 
Prof. Imwinkelried’s Example #3: Incidents Repudiating the Witness that Occurred in 
Connection With  Prior Unrelated Litigation30 
 
According to Prof. Imwinkelried, this category includes evidence of the result in a civil 
action, for example where the witness was a party and an adverse verdict clearly establishes his 
                                                          
26 Paul F. Rothstein, Myrna S. Raeder, & David Crump, EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL 173 (6th Ed. 2012). 
 
27 Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 238-40. 
28 Id. 
29 See references to Rule 403 and advocacy of a discretionary standard in Imwinkelried, note 2, supra, particularly 
at 240-41 and summarized in his conclusion appearing at 242. 
30 This example is set forth at Imwinkelried, note 2 supra, at 228 et seq. 
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position as a party was fabricated, or where he was only a witness but the verdict makes it clear 
the trier of fact rejected his contention as fabricated. The prior civil action we assume is 
unrelated to the subject of the present trial, because otherwise the point made by me under 
example #1 above, to the effect that this is not character evidence governed by 608(b) at all, 
would apply. In other words, the evidence here is offered to show a propensity to lie in general, 
not just about the matter on which the witness is testifying in the present case. 
Imwinkelried believes this evidence is excluded automatically by 608(b)’s ban on 
extrinsic evidence whether it is just referred to in a question-and-answer on cross (which he 
would call “tucking in”) or goes beyond that by physically introducing the documents (or a 
recording or other witness) establishing the previous judicial event casting doubt on the 
witness.31 He thinks they both should be allowed subject to 403 discretion.32 
I believe the former form (“tucking in”) is not extrinsic evidence, but rather is intrinsic 
evidence because it takes place entirely on cross examination and involves introducing no other 
evidence than the question-and-answer there. Thus it is not excluded by 608(b)’s automatic 
extrinsic-evidence ban and consequently is admissible subject to 403 discretion. In contrast, the 
latter form (physically introducing other evidence) is extrinsic evidence subject to 608(b)’s 
automatic ban, and rightfully so. My reasoning on all these points is the same as those I 
advanced above in my discussion of Imwinkelried’s example #2 (documents establishing the 
witness’s misdeed) and in my section labeled “conclusion” below.33 In essence Example #3 is 
very like Example #2. 
Briefly stated, I am saying regarding this #3,  that if the witness can be gotten to admit 
during his cross exam the occurrence of the civil adverse event, the fact that the cross examiner 
mentioned the event during cross in order to elicit the admission, is not extrinsic evidence and 
consequently is not banned by 608. Nor is the witness’s admission, since it all takes place in 
cross examination.  The “tucking in” point and the 2003 Advisory Committee Note, are wrong 
on this.34 So, the entire exchange would be admissible, subject to Rule 403 discretion.  
Suppose the witness does not admit it occurred or admits and attempts to explain it. Then 
any attempt of the impeaching attorney to do more than orally explore or refute during cross the 
witness’s denial or explanation—for example if the attorney attempts at any point to physically 
introduce some other evidence to explore or refute it--would properly in my view, be banned as 
extrinsic, for the reasons stated. It would not be worth the downside risks. Inducement to perjury 
is not a significant concern.35 
 
CONCLUSION 
                                                          
31 See Imwinkelried, note 2 supra, at 228-29. 
32 Id. 
33 See text between notes 20-27 supra and between notes 36-41 infra and surrounding text. 
34 See text between and surrounding footnotes 22-25 supra. 
35 See text between and surrounding notes 27- 29 supra and 41-42 infra.. 
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Prof. Imwinkelried argues that 608(b) needs amendment to allow the judge to admit a 
witness’s unconvicted misdeeds that indicate incredibility regardless of whether the misdeed is 
intrinsically or extrinsically adduced, whenever in an individual case the evidence is found by 
the judge to be probative on credibility to a degree outweighing potential prejudice, confusion, 
and time consumption.  
Prof. Imwinkelried’s whole case is based almost entirely on his three enumerated 
examples. These are his “proof” that certain evidence of misdeeds of witnesses can on occasion 
be very good economical evidence of incredibility yet will be banned by the terms of 608(b). 
I submit that Rule 608(b) does not absolutely ban the evidence in his three categories and 
that therefore the judge can often admit it in her/his discretion. This is because in some instances 
the evidence is not the kind of character evidence covered by the Rule in the first place. This is 
the case in his #1, prior false rape allegations against the defendant. In other instances the 
evidence is not banned because it is not really “extrinsic.” This is the case in his #2, documents 
proving an unrelated lying incident, to the extent the witness admits the contents of the 
document; and his #3, unrelated civil results suggesting lying, to the extent the civil event that 
challenges the witness’s credibility can be shown entirely through the cross examination of the 
witness.  
Since there is no absolute ban, the judge indeed often already has the weighing discretion 
to admit deserving evidence in these categories that Prof. Imwinkelried advocates. All relevant 
evidence (which these categories unquestionably contain) that is not within a ban, is subject to 
Rule 403, which grants such judicial discretion. 36  
I further submit that when Imwinkelried’s #2 (documents attesting to the unrelated lying 
incident of the witness) and #3 (unrelated civil results suggesting a propensity to lie) are offered 
via truly extrinsic evidence (for example via documents or witnesses truly introduced 
independently of the cross examination), they should automatically be excluded as 608(b) does 
since they are almost always of marginal utility, and I therefore do not agree with Imwinkelried 
that there should be discretion to admit them. They would normally be too time consuming or 
carry things too far afield for their legitimate worth. The fact-finder would tend to get confused 
about what wrongdoing is actually the central focus of the trial. It is not worth the risk of a trial 
within a trial that in all fairness would necessarily be engendered. It should be noted again in this 
regard that many jurisdictions absolutely exclude even wholly intrinsic evidence of this kind as 
not worth the time and prejudicial distraction, and not worth arguing over, even though intrinsic 
evidence is confined to cross examination where these downside dangers are at a minimum.37  
Whether intrinsically or extrinsically adduced, character evidence of this sort involves a 
rather diffuse and easily exaggerated but actually very weak form of proof--a general character 
for lying offered to prove lying on a particular occasion. Lots of literature questions whether 
                                                          
36 See Paul F. Rothstein, Myrna S. Raeder, & David Crump, EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL 72-84 (6th Ed. 2012). 
37 Paul F. Rothstein, Myrna S. Raeder, & David Crump, EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL 173 (6th Ed. 2012). 
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character showings have any predictive power at all.38 It may (or may not!) be worth spending a 
little capital on such evidence during cross examination, where the negative effects are low, but 
certainly not when the evidence goes beyond the cross examination. And, in the normal case, the 
extrinsic evidence banned by 608(b) can be expected to add little to what could be gotten through 
cross examination.  
Thus discretion to admit the extrinsic evidence exhorted by Imwinkelried is in my 
opinion a bad idea. An automatic ban on the extrinsic evidence of general character for 
credibility as 608(b) imposes is appropriate and preferable to spending time, effort, expense, 
argument, and judicial resources on an unpredictable individualized discretionary judgment on 
the facts of each particular case.  
Aside from Prof. Imwinkelried’s three examples, I doubt that there are other instances 
where extrinsic unconvicted-misdeed evidence39 offered to show a bad credibility-character is 
ever worth the downside risks we have discussed. Rarely if ever will there be other important 
kinds of evidence excluded by the Rule’s ban. In my view, the extrinsic evidence that the Rule’s 
ban excludes—if the Rule is correctly interpreted--is almost always of marginal significance, can 
frequently be suggested by intrinsic evidence, and is normally outweighed by the downside 
dangers discussed. As noted, many jurisdictions exclude this kind of evidence even if it is only 
intrinsically offered. Despite the fact that the downside risks are minimized when the evidence is 
intrinsic, these jurisdictions still feel the risks outweigh the benefits of this character evidence. 
When it seems fairly certain in advance that almost all evidence in a category—like the 
extrinsic evidence of credibility character that 608(b) bans--will be of marginal significance or 
time consuming, prejudicial, and confusing beyond its worth, a blanket rule of inadmissibility is 
to be preferred over a rule of judicial discretion, which promotes litigation over how the 
discretion should be exercised on the facts of each particular case before individual judges who 
have particular proclivities, and fosters unpredictability, dis-uniformity, and consequent 
unfairness as among like cases.  
Indeed, by the same token as argued by Prof. Imwinkelried for this evidence, it could be 
argued that almost everything covered by the entire Federal Rules of Evidence, should have been 
left to judicial discretion on the facts of each particular case, rather than subjected to the 
exclusionary rules that exist in that body of rules. After all, occasionally an important and 
economical piece of evidence might be excluded by these exclusionary rules. But for the reasons 
discussed above, the Rules subject many areas to rule-mandated inadmissibility. One such area, 
quite properly, is the area we are concerned with here, that is, extrinsic unconvicted misdeed 
                                                          
38The writings of Prof.  David Leonard collected much of this literature including psychological findings. See, e.g., 
David P. Leonard, The Use of Character to Prove Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis in the Law of Evidence, 58 
U.Colo. L. Rev. 1 (1986-88). 
39 Remember, we are talking about non-convictions. The solidity and economy of proof makes convictions a 
different case. See F.R.E. 609. 
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evidence to show credibility character. A good case could even be made that unless the evidence 
is solidified in a conviction, even the intrinsic form should be banned.40 
 I therefore conclude that Rule 608(b) properly automatically bans extrinsic evidence of 
unconvicted-for misdeeds offered to show bad credibility-character. Although that way we might 
occasionally be excluding something that on balance is of some legitimate value, such cases will 
be rare. Having a predictable uniform rule—rather than constantly litigating the balancing issue 
with the judge and on appeal-- is more important in this area.  
Professor Imwinkelried throughout his article argues that there is no extrinsic evidence 
ban regarding other forms of credibility impeachment such as showing the witness made prior 
inconsistent statements, has a bias, has poor perceptual ability or memory, has been convicted, 
has a bad reputation for veracity, or is contradicted by other witnesses or other witnesses have a 
bad opinion of his veracity. Imwinkelried asks why those forms of impeachment are treated 
differently than the misdeed credibility character attack covered by 608(b) that we are discussing 
in these articles. Why is only this form of impeachment subject to an extrinsic evidence 
prohibition. The answer is, at least in part, that most of those other forms of impeachment are as 
a general matter much more probative on the issue of credibility and less likely to be exaggerated 
by the fact-finder. The impeachment covered by 608 (b) involves an inference from general 
character, which is a very unreliable and easily exaggerated inference. While it is true that 
impeachment by general reputation or opinion also involves a weak character inference, the time 
that kind of impeachment consumes is easily confined. 
I do agree with Imwinkelried that letting a witness know he cannot be challenged may 
occasionally invite perjury—that is, invite the witness to lie by denying a misdeed that he did 
commit.41 Nevertheless, I think this risk is small.  Perjury is a crime, and by-and-large witnesses 
think twice about perjuring themselves, even though it is true that perjury of this kind is seldom 
prosecuted and there is a civil privilege that may prevent lawsuits against the perjuring witness, 
as Imwinkelried points out.42 But the cost of Imwinkelried’s solution would be too great. It 
                                                          
40 Recall that we are not talking about evidence in Imwinkelried’s category #1 (former false rape allegations) which 
is not this kind of evidence at all. See text between notes 9-12 supra. 
 
41 See Imwinkelried, note 2 supra, at 238-40. 
 
42 Id.  If there is a problem here, it would seem to be one that should be addressed by reform of the law and of 
prosecutorial practices. Prof. Imwinkelreid’s solution, to grant judicial discretion regarding extrinsic evidence, still 
presents the risk of perjury. There would still be instances where a judge in the exercise of the discretion would 
disallow the extrinsic refutation of the witness’s perjurious denial of wrongdoing. Furthermore, the same 
inducement to perjury that Imwinkelried decries currently exists in a number of places in Evidence law. Under 
F.R.E. 405(a), extrinsic evidence contradicting a possibly perjurious denial of a character witness’s knowledge of 
contradicting incidents cannot be adduced (see Paul F. Rothstein, Myrna S. Raeder, & David Crump, EVIDENCE IN A 
NUTSHELL 115-5  (6th Ed. 2012)); and the collateral matters rule that may disallow extrinsic evidence of a 
contradiction or inconsistency. Id. at 283-87. And, Rule 403 is a general rule allowing the judge to disallow 
refutations of falsehoods in many instances. It is true that witnesses in these areas and under Imwinkelried’s 
proposal granting discretion, cannot always predict in advance whether the refutation will be allowed or not, so 
the “inducement” to commit perjury might be less. Probably, however, under Imwinkelried’s proposal a practice 
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would mean litigating about the admissibility of evidence that almost always is of marginal 
importance, and too time consuming, misleading, confusing, and prejudicial for its worth.  
In sum Prof. Imwinkelried, in his excellent and thought-provoking article, is correct that a 
number of courts are excluding some evidence in categories #1, #2, and #3 that they shouldn’t. 
He does a service by calling our attention to that. The courts are doing it because they are under 
the impression that Rule 608(b) by its literal terms demands it. Prof. Imwinkelried believes this 
is a proper impression and exhorts the revision of Rule 608(b). I believe it is a mistaken 
impression. But at any rate, he and I agree they should not automatically exclude everything in 
these categories. He generalizes that there are lots of other instances as well, where deserving 
evidence is nevertheless banned automatically by the literal terms of 608(b)’s extrinsic evidence 
prohibition. I do not believe that case has been made.  
Nevertheless his article is in the highest traditions of scholarship—to stimulate thoughts 
and thoughtful debates that might not otherwise have been born, as he has done here and 
countless times in the past. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
would develop of exercising the discretion in favor of excluding extrinsic evidence of misdeeds except in 
extraordinary cases, and savvy witnesses would know this in advance.  
